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I. INTRODUCTION
During the nineteenth century, intellectual property rights
were critical to the emerging industrial society. By the end of
that century, two major international treaties, the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works' and
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,2
each sought to advance the rule of law and improve standards for
the protection of intellectual property around the world. One
hundred years later, the strengthening of those intellectual
property rights became a fundamental issue for the nascent
information economy, just as they were an international priority
for the Industrial Revolution.
As information and communication technologies
dramatically changed the economy, a critical link between the
protection of information flows and economic growth developed.
In 1985, the United States and Israel signed the first free trade
agreement that associated intellectual property rights with
improved trade.3 This agreement was the harbinger of the
emergence of a networked society and the importance of legal
protection for information. The agreement set the stage for a
powerful world-wide movement. One year later, the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations launched the
international harmonization of intellectual property rights.4 By
the next decade, this legal movement was under attack from the
network itself.
The adaptation, over the last decade, of intellectual property
to the internet context is at the center of a deep struggle between
democratic governance and network governance. This struggle is
a fundamental battle over the control of rulemaking for the new
information society. The merger between the role of intellectual
1. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
2. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13
U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303.
3. See Israel-United States Free Trade Area Agreement art. 14, Apr. 22, 1985, 24
I.L.M. 653, 662 (establishing "favored nation" status between Israel and the United States
for the purposes of protecting intellectual property rights and strengthening and
developing economic relations between the two countries).
4. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994); see also
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, tit. 5, 108 Stat. 4809, 4973-89 (1994)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) (approving and implementing the
trade agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations).
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property law and the rule of law is at the heart of a struggle to
define the governance of the Internet economy and the
information society. Today, the design and enforcement of
intellectual property rights are at the forefront of a profound
power struggle between democratically chosen legal rules and
technologist-defined network rules. While public choice views the
legal rules as a product of special-interest group politics,' these
rules remain the formal expression of democratic institutions.'
Insurgency movements led by technologists and technically savvy
users are, in effect, revolting against democratically adopted laws
with a technological assault on the rules of intellectual property
law. For example, file-sharing programs like Napster and
Grockster threatened copyright law and were fought off by
difficult court cases.' More recently, GooglePrint and YouTube
are challenging content owners' control of their works.8 This
defiance forms an underlying challenge to the rule of law. The
adaptation of intellectual property law in general, and copyright
law in particular, are at the center of this struggle between
democratic governance and network governance by an unelected
technological elite.
This Article argues that the technological attacks on
intellectual property are a movement against democratically
chosen intellectual property rules. They form a basic challenge to
the rule of law and to the control of the rules wired into the
network.9 In making this argument, the Article first maintains
5. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23 (2001) ("Copyright bills passed only
after private stakeholders agreed with one another on their substantive provisions.").
6. A discussion of the legitimacy of democratic institutions and their rulemaking is
beyond the scope of this Article.
7. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2001)
(finding that defendant Napster infringed upon the copyrights of A&M Records and that
Napster members were not engaging in a fair use of copyrighted material); see also Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918-19 (2005) (finding
defendants Grokster and StreamCast secondarily liable for the copyright infringement of
their third party software users).
8. See Class Action Complaint at 2, Author's Guild v. Google, 05-CV-8136
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Author's Complaint] (alleging on behalf of the
plaintiff Author's Guild, the largest organization of authors in the United States, that
Google has engaged in "massive" copyright infringement by creating digital archives of
several libraries' book collections); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief and
Damages at 2, Viacom Int'l v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-CV-2103 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007)
(alleging that defendant YouTube willfully infringes upon copyrights "on a huge scale" by
displaying numerous unauthorized copyrighted videos).
9. For a discussion of rules embedded in technologies, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). See also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:
The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553,
553-54 (1998) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Lex Informatica] (comparing law to the
rulemaking characteristics of technological infrastructure choices and designs); Joel R.
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that intellectual property rights have an important public
function in democracy in that they mark political, economic, and
social boundaries. Next, the Article shows that the public law, as
enacted by governments, has reallocated intellectual property
rights to adapt to the information economy. While many aspects
of this new allocation of rights have been controversial, these
decisions nevertheless emanate from public authorities. The
Article then analyzes the rejection of those rules by technologists
and their fight to take control of rulemaking. In essence, the
technical community seeks to replace the state's decision on
public intellectual property law with the community's own
private preferences in subversion of democratic choices. The
Article concludes with several predictions and prescriptions.
II. THE PUBLIC FUNCTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Intellectual property rights serve critical public functions.
The design and control of information are profoundly connected
with democracy and democratic values." The regulation of
information and the protection assigned to information flows are
at the heart of democracy." By defining the rules of access to and
control of information, intellectual property rights create the
demarcation lines in a networked society of economic, political,
and social interactions.
In defining these rules, intellectual property rights express
public values. Patents and copyrights seek to promote scientific
progress and social welfare by defining rewards for authors and
inventors for the dissemination of their ideas and innovations.
Jessica Litman writes "[t]he purpose of copyright is to encourage
the creation and mass dissemination of a wide variety of works."2
Neil Netanel and Niva Elkin-Koren each teach us that copyright
law plays a formative role in democratic society by striking a
balance for the creation and dissemination of ideas and
expression."
Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging the Trade and
Technical Paradigms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 288 (1993) (describing the embedding of
policy choices in technological designs).
10. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283, 347-64 (1996) (illustrating the ways in which copyright "support[s]
democratic civil society").
11. See id. at 356 (describing copyright protection as a "pillar of public liberty").
12. Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 2
(2004).
13. See Niva Elkin-Koren, It's All About Control: Rethinking Copyright in the New
Information Landscape, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 79, 104-05 (Niva
Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002) (demonstrating that the open
1076 [44:4
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Intellectual property law has a critical normative role. The
allocation of rights to assure the balance of public values in the
dissemination of knowledge, the incentive to create, and the
freedom of expression are political choices.14 In the context of the
Internet, recent copyright reforms such as the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)' 5 illustrate what Joseph Liu
termed "regulatory copyright," or complex and targeted
protections designed to support particular industries' markets. 6
As an explicit example, the Clinton Administration's Information
Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) recommended the expansion of
copyright to digital works in order to promote private investment
in infrastructure and to support markets for Hollywood
products. 7 In essence, the Internet economy triggered a trend in
democratic choice to embody market philosophies. As envisioned
by the Clinton Administration, the public function of copyright
needed to expand to structure the development of network
technologies because the government did not have sufficient
funds to continue the development of the Internet for commercial
purposes. 1
In a democracy, these balances and choices are defined by
public law and made through national legislative processes. For
example, the U.S. Constitution delegates power to the Congress
dissemination of information and ideas is key to civic virtue); Netanel, supra note 10, at
285 (arguing that copyright law strikes a "precarious balance" by encouraging authors to
create and disseminate original expression by according them proprietary rights in their
works, while at the same time inviting audiences and subsequent authors to use existing
works in every way possible without infringing the copyright holder's proprietary rights).
14. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 13, at 81-82 (noting that copyright laws are
tremendously affected by political influences); Netanel, supra note 10, at 347 (explaining
that, in creating a legal framework to govern copyright, "the state deliberately and
selectively employs market institutions to support a democratic civil society").
15. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
16. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 88-92 (2004)
(arguing that, in recent years, Congress has enacted increasingly complex, industry
specific, intellectual property rights legislation).
17. See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 12, 211-36 (1995) (recommending the expansion of
copyright protection to digital media); see also Daniel C. Higgs, Lexmark International,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. & Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Technologies, Inc.: The DMCA and Durable Goods Aftermarkets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
59, 60-61 (2004) (arguing that the IITF was tremendously influenced by the motion
picture and publishing industries in making its recommendations to Congress).
18. See THE WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 3
(1997), available at http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm (taking the
position that the private sector should lead the way in the maximization of electronic
commerce); Litman, supra note 12, at 3 (explaining that creating the national information
infrastructure was beyond the federal government's funding abilities).
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to enact legislation protecting intellectual property. 9 In other
countries, such as France, the constitutional structure similarly
delegates intellectual property law decisions to the legislature."
Recently, the French Constitutional Court even linked the scope
of intellectual property rights to the famous French Declaration
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789.21 In essence,
national statutory rights such as the DMCA 22 or the French
Copyright Reform Act 23 support particular policy positions.
Even at the international level, the framework for
intellectual property rights adopts the political choice to promote
market philosophies through national legislation. The Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS
Agreement"), for example, links intellectual property rights to
trade and requires that signatory governments enact rights in
their domestic public laws. 24 The World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty similarly asks states to
expand the scope of copyright protection to the digital economy
through enactments in domestic public law.25 This push to
incorporate intellectual property rights within the multilateral
trade regime was a re-enforcement of the public function. Trade
agreements embody commercial values and political goals. The
inclusion of intellectual property in the World Trade
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[tjo promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries").
20. 1958 CONST. art. 34 (Fr.) (granting Parliament the authority to establish rules
concerning property rights).
21. See CC decision no. 06-540DC, July 27, 2006, Rec. 88 (referring to human rights
in finding that the EU copyright directive did not violate French constitutional
principles); see also Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual
Property and the European Court of Human Rights 4, 55 (Vanderbilt U. Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory, Vanderbilt U. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 07-05,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976485 (arguing that French courts have
increasingly linked intellectual property laws with fundamental rights).
22. Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
23. Law No, 2006-961 of Aug. 1, 2006, Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran~aise
[J.O.1 [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 3, 2006, p. 11529 (implementing European
Directive 2001/29 and substantially modifying the French Intellectual Property code).
24. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994) (establishing minimum international standards of intellectual property
protection within the international trade legal framework); see also Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4973-89 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) (implementing TRIPS in U.S. law).
25. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty arts. 4-5, Dec. 20,
1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 152 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty] (extending
copyright protection to computer programs and compilations of data in any form which by
reason of the selection or arrangements of their contents constitute intellectual creations).
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Organization (WTO) enshrines the demarcation of the
boundaries around the world between access and distribution
rights to information.
III. THE REALLOCATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR
THE INTERNET ECONOMY
As democracies reacted to the digital economy, they began to
redefine the allocation of intellectual property rights. In the past,
where public law once set the balance among the public values of
knowledge dissemination, freedom of expression, and creator's
rewards, states have now enacted a shift to private
decisionmaking. This redistribution of intellectual property is, in
effect, a shift from an essentially public allocation defined by law
to a private allocation defined by technology and contract that is
supported by law.
The redistributional shift occurred through several steps.
First, for digital works, technology began to directly regulate
access to information." This is the "code" or "Lex Informatica"
regime.27 Digital rights management tools shifted protection from
the content itself to control over the conditions of access to
content. Second, a movement of public law reforms, through both
international obligations28 and national law,29 added protections
against the circumvention of technical measures controlling
access to content. This movement sanctioned the transfer of
control from publicly defined access rights to technologically and
privately defined access. By protecting technological access
control mechanisms, public law now delegates decisions on
balancing to private authority. As Jessica Litman writes:
26. See Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, supra note 9, at 564 (discussing technical
controls for the management of intellectual property).
27. See LESSIG, supra note 9, at 6 ("Code is law."); Reidenberg, Lex Informatica,
supra note 9, at 555 ("[T]he set of rules for information flows imposed by technology and
communication networks form a 'Lex Informatica' that policymakers must understand,
consciously recognize, and encourage.").
28. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 25, art. 11 ("Contracting Parties
shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection
with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that
restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned
or permitted by law.").
Id.; Council Directive 2001/29, art. 6.3, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC) [hereinafter Council
Directive] (defining effective "technological measures" as means designed to restrict acts
not authorized by the copyright holder).
29. See, e.g., Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 1201, 112
Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)) (protecting against
circumvention by criminalizing the use of technology that circumvents copyright
protection measures).
20071 1079
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Augmenting copyright law with legally enforceable access
control could completely annul the first sale doctrine. More
fundamentally, enforceable access control has the potential
to redesign the copyright landscape completely....
Copyrighted works contain protected and unprotected
elements, and access to those works may advance restricted
or unrestricted uses. Access controls are not so
discriminating. Once we permit copyright owners to exert
continuing control over consumers' access to the contents of
their works, there is no way to ensure that access controls
will not prevent consumers from seeing the unprotected
facts and ideas in a work .
In the context of trademark rights, a similar shift toward
privatization of the allocation of rights occurred for the Internet. As
domain names evolved for internet websites, they were managed
under the auspices of the U.S. government. The Internet Assigned
Number Authority (LANA), an association of system experts led by
Jon Postel, allocated domain names to "Internet protocol"
addresses."' As domain names took on economic value, like
trademarks, the responsibility for the attribution of names to
numeric IP addresses was transferred by the U.S. government to a
new, nonprofit company, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN).32 This legal shift, in effect and by
design, privatized the allocation of domain names."
At the same time that the public law moved the allocation of
rights to private decisionmaking, there was a shift to strengthen
this privatization through public enforcement. For example, when
Adobe faced the distribution of software that would defeat its copy
protection mechanisms for eBook, Adobe succeeded in persuading a
government prosecutor to bring criminal proceedings against
Dmitry Skylarov, a programmer, and Elcomsoft, his employer,
rather than pursue civil litigation under the copyright law. 4
30. LITMAN, supra note 5, at 83.
31. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31741, 31741-
42 (June 10, 1998) ("[M]ajor components of the domain name system are still performed
by, or subject to, agreements with agencies of the U.S. Government.").
32. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of
Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Nov. 25, 1998),
available at httpJ/www.icann.org/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm.
33. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L. J. 17, 18 (2000) (arguing that using
ICANN, rather than the U.S. Department of Commerce, to regulate domain names
"violates fundamental values and policies designed to ensure democratic control over the
use of government power, and sets a precedent that risks being expanded into other
regulatory activities").
34. See Lisa M. Bowman, ElcomSoft Verdict: Not Guilty, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 17,
1080 [44:4
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Many strong and legitimate criticisms may be leveled at
the privatization, through technology, of the public law
function. Prominent intellectual property scholars like Pamela
Samuelson decry this "rights grab,"35 and others argue that legal
deference to technological rulemaking is not a desirable
instrument to achieve the goals of copyright." This legal shift,
however, is a democratic decision in the way states chose to
adapt intellectual property to the Internet economy. The
reallocation of the intellectual property rights is the result of a
democratic process. Sixty-four sovereign states have chosen to
sign the WIPO Copyright Treaty3 7 and 151 nations agreed to
adhere to the WTO TRIPS agreement.38 The choice by nations to
adhere to these agreements requires the internal adoption of
specific rules by national parliaments. The WIPO Copyright
Treaty requires protection against the circumvention of
technical measures." As such, the digital rights decisions are
also internal choices made by nations for the governance of
their information societies. The implementation of international
standards is thus a democratic choice by representative
governments. For example, the DMCA reflects the U.S.
interpretation of its international obligations and sets out the
internal rules in the United States.4" In a similar fashion, the
2002, http//news.com.com/2100-1023-978176.html (describing how prosecutors, working
with Adobe, brought suit against Skylarov and Elcomsoft).
35. See Pamela Samuleson, The Copyright Grab, 4.01 WIRED 134, 135-36 (1996); see
also Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2003)
(opposing the "new sweeping rights of access to technologically protected works" because
it may mean "content owners will no longer honor the balance of public interest embedded
within the law of copyright"); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital
Economy: Why the Anticircumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 519, 562-63 (1999) (arguing that the DMCA's anticircumvention provisions are
overbroad and dangerous to fair use, competition, and innovation).
36. See Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 142, 148, 152 (2004) (questioning the societal
fairness of the outcomes of private contract and technology ordering of copyright).
37. See World Intellectual Property Org., WIPO Copyright Treaty: Contracting
Parties, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty-id=16 (last
visited Oct. 19, 2007) (listing the sixty-four states that have adopted the WIPO Copyright
Treaty as of April 26, 2007).
38. See World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.orglenglish/thewto-e/whatis-eltif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2007)
(listing the WTO's 151 member states as of July 27, 2007).
39. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 25, art. 11 (stating that the contracting
parties will provide legal protection and remedies against the circumvention of
technological measures "used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights").
40. See David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots
of the DMCA's Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 915-16 (2002) (stating that the
United States passed the DMCA to update U.S. copyright law and to comply with the
WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty).
20071 1081
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European Union's (EU) copyright directive requires the EU
member states to enact conforming national laws.4'
IV. THE FIGHT TO CONTROL RULEMAKING
The reallocation of intellectual property rights brought
strong opposition and a new fight to control rulemaking for the
internet economy. Network elites objected to the legislative
choices because they opposed the perceived outcomes that would
result from the private sector decisions on the public values
inherent in intellectual property rules. Substantive objections
centered particularly on the anticircumvention rules and their
effects on platform changes, use controls, and harms to public
interests.4 Two forms of protest ensued. An academic branch of
the opposition engaged in democratic debate and sought public
discussion of the harmful shift in rights.4 But a second form of
opposition captured the community of the technology-savvy and
became the information society's techno-revolutionary movement.
Underlying this insurgency is a profound and troubling rejection
of collective self-governance and democracy.
In terms of the democratic protests, there are both academic
and political efforts to promote change in the public law.
Significant academic literature decries what James Boyle terms
the "second enclosure movement"44 or what others see as the
over-strengthening of property rights in information. These
41. See Council Directive, supra note 28, art. 6.1 (requiring member states to
provide "legal protection against the circumvention of effective technological measures").
42. See Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899,
949-50 & n.261 (2007) (listing objections to anticircumvention law and its effect on the
public interest in copyright).
43. Dan L. Burk & Julie Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management, 15
HARv. J. L. & TECH. 41, 54-55 (2001) (introducing proposed DMCA modifications that
would balance copyright protection with "legitimate fair use privileges of the public").
44. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37 (2003) (explaining that the "second
enclosure movement" is essentially "'the enclosure of the intangible commons of the
mind'").
45. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 269 (2004) (concluding
that there is danger in media concentration because it can call upon property rights to
justify its actions); LITMAN, supra note 5, at 14 (expressing concern over the current
expansion of copyright law and the possibility of a "collision between our expectations of
freedom of expression and the enhanced copyright law"); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried
View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2064 (2000)
(expressing the opinion that the result of a "perfectly enclosed information environment"
is 'socially irresponsible" and "probably unconstitutional"); Yochai Benkler, Intellectual
Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81,
81-82 (2002) (explaining that "strong intellectual property rights" are not beneficial in
"increasing aggregate information production," and are actually "likely to lead to
1082 [44:4
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scholars seek to achieve change through reasoned argument and
the victory of ideas in the political arena.46 At the same time,
there are social and political action movements pushing for a
different allocation of intellectual property rights. For example,
street protest marches challenged the application of the DMCA.47
These efforts illustrate a commitment to the rule of law and the
democratic political process. They accept collective democratic
decisions, yet try to change them by promoting alternative
political choices.
In a similar vein, the Creative Commons project, launched
by the Harvard Berkman Center for Internet and Society and the
Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, sought to
expand the public domain of creative works of authorship."
Creative Commons tries to "use private rights to create public
goods: creative works set free for certain uses." 9 In other words,
Creative Commons uses existing copyright law and licensing
arrangements to expand the amount of content in the public
domain. Niva Elkin-Koren calls this approach "subversive"
because these proponents of a broader public domain do not lobby
for new legislation, but rather seek "to redefine social norms and
promote values of sharing and reusing.""° While the approach
may be subversive in one sense, the proponents are engaged in
classic political action in that they seek to change social norms
through legal means-copyright and contract law practices. The
proponents are not trying to undermine the existence of
proprietary content. Thus, this approach, the distribution of
content through the licensing of substantive rights without
commercialization, concentration, and homogenization of information production"); Julie
E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 347-48 (2005)
(disapproving of the "absence of the user" in copyright law because it "makes for bad
theory, bad policy, and bad law"); Dan L. Burk & Tarleton Gillespie, Autonomy and
Morality in DRM and AntiCircumvention, 4 TRIPLE C 239, 244 (2006),
http://triplec.uti.at/files/tripleC4(2)-Burk-Gillespie.pdf (explaining that digital rights
management "'lock-out' technology" is troubling because of "the preemptive constraints it
imposes upon information users").
46. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 45, at 373-74 (calling for lawmakers to adjust
default copyright rules in order to promote creativity and progress).
47. See, e.g., Support Rally for Dimitry Skylarov in Denver, CO USA on 19th/Stout,
http://www.mountainbitwarrior.com/RANTS/DMCA/010723/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2007)
(chronicling a rally in support of Dimitry Skylarov, who was charged with circumventing
copyright protection measures in violation of the DMCA).
48. See Creative Commons, History, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/History (last
visited Aug. 27, 2007) (explaining the organization's goal of developing a new, reasonable
set of copyright rules to counter the current overprotective default rules, thereby
increasing overall public access to creative works).
49. Id.
50. Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 394 (2005).
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threatening the existence of proprietary content, reflects a
significant commitment to the rule of law.
By contrast, an important network elite appears to reject
democratic choices made by the political institutions and seeks to
enforce its own rule preferences on the Internet. Tim Wu writes
insightfully of the choices between avoidance and change
mechanisms for those who disagree with the statutory allocations
of rights to digital works. Wu argues that designers of code strive
to minimize, through technological functions, the cost of
compliance with the law rather than seek to change the law
itself.5' He labels this strategy an avoidance mechanism, as
opposed to a change mechanism in which interest groups lobby
for statutory changes .
The network community's avoidance mechanisms, however,
have a much deeper significance. They are in reality intellectual
property evasion mechanisms. The distinction is important.
Avoidance implies that the mechanism is structured for
underlying activity the law does not prohibit. 3 Evasion, however,
connotes that the underlying activity is illicit and the purpose of
the mechanism is to facilitate law-breaking. 4 This is also the
distinction between civil disobedience-violating the law for the
purpose of achieving law reform that benefits society at large-
and civil selfishness-violating the law for personal gain and
rejecting the rule of law."
The rejection of the democratically chosen rule of law is well
illustrated by the development of peer-to-peer ("P2P") technology.
P2P software allows the sharing of files among users'
computers. Its existence and popularity are largely the result of
51. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 708-09 (2003) (providing
examples of how code designers "define behavior to avoid legal sanction").
52. Id. at 708 ("Code design... is a mechanism of avoidance rather than a mechanism
of change.").
53. Id. at 692 (coining the term "avoision" as a category of avoidance and defining it
as "efforts to exploit the differences between a law's goals and its self defined limits").
54. See id. at 691-92 (defining evasion as 'an investment in decreasing the odds of
being punished for violating a law," and providing examples such as "[wlearing a mask to
rob a bank, buying a radar detector, hiring expensive defense lawyers, and bribing police
officers").
55. See Matthew R. Hall, Guilty But Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil
Disobedience and the Rule of Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2083, 2083-84 (2007) (limiting
civil disobedience to categories that compel one to break the law so that a "democratic
society will correct its mistakes, or at least reexamine intensely divisive decisions"); see
also Eduardo Moisbs Pefialver & Sonia K Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
1095, 1128-29 (2007) (discussing Ronald Dworkin's distinction between civil disobedience
and ordinary selfishness).
56. See CNET News.com, Glossary: Peer-to-Peer Network, http://www.cnet.coml
Resources/Info/GlossaryITerms/peer.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2007) (defining a peer-to-
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interest in sharing music files. The early technology designs
encouraged a social norm for file sharing in flagrant disregard of
the copyright law. First generation programs, notably Napster,
were in effect designed to help users violate music owners'
copyrights. 8 Napster even "advertised the ease with which users
could find their favorite popular music without 'wading through
page after page of unknown artists."'59
Second generation file-sharing programs sought to code
around the key court rulings holding software producers liable
for their users' infringement.6" More precisely, developers
explicitly tried to evade legal authority. Second generation
programs were constructed to allow users to continue to trade
illicitly in copyrighted digital music while evading the pitfalls
that sidelined Napster.6' For example, the developers of Gnutella
cynically claimed that it was "a technology, not a music-piracy
tool," but expressly designed the technology to
"withstand... lawyers" and be "absolutely unstoppable."2
FastTrack/Morpheus and Gnutella, in effect, tried to side-step
the rulings in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3. com, Inc." and A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.64 In both cases, the courts imposed
peer network as the ability of a computer to share files with other computers on the
network without the need of a dedicated server).
57. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 548-49
(showing that "charismatic code" was designed to magnify a sense of reciprocity by
deceiving users into believing cooperative behavior is prevalent on the network, thus
encouraging large numbers of people to disregard the law).
58. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918-19 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (noting that Napster was not simply a conduit to transfer files, but was designed
specifically to locate music, the majority of which is copyrighted), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir., 2001) (agreeing with the district court that Napster
provided "'the site and facilities'" for secondary infringement).
59. Id. at 904.
60. See Wu, supra note 51, at 726-37 (describing the evolution of P2P file-sharing
software as a mechanism of avoidance of intellectual property rights).
61. Id. at 730-37 (illustrating how the successors of Napster were "designed to
avoid the copyright lawsuit that had befallen Napster").
62. See Gnutellanews.com, What is Gnutella?, http://web.archive.org/web/
20020204135859/http://www.gnutellanews.com/information/whatjisgnutella.shtml (last
visited Sept. 16, 2007), cited in Strahilevitz, supra note 57, at 516-18 (commenting on the
lengths Gnutella went to distinguish themselves from Napster's legal limitations).
Interestingly, Gnutella removed these incriminating quotes from its website, so the
passage can only be found in Internet archives.
63. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350-53 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (finding copyright infringement in MP3.com's coding and transmission of MP3's to
its users and denying MP3.com's assertion of "fair use" because the reproduction was not
"transformative").
64. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (enjoining Napster from
"engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or
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copyright liability on the technologists who aided users in
sharing copyrighted music. These holdings were based in part on
the centralized index features of those programs that were akin
to card catalogs and enabled users to find copyrighted music
files.65 The second generation software left out the centralized
card-catalog function." Indeed, as Tim Wu notes, "[pirogrammers
wrote FastTrack and Gnutella to exploit loopholes left by the
Napster decision."67 The developers of Gnutella were explicitly
revolting against legal authority. Not surprisingly, in the wake of
Napster's shut down, Gnutella became a technology of choice for
those looking to download music files illicitly without the
permission of the copyright owners.68
Lior Strahilevitz also observed that "[t]he file-swapping
networks therefore represent a particularly brazen and
successful attack on intellectual property rights. 69 Strahilevitz
demonstrated that file-sharing's "charismatic code" actually
creates a deception to encourage law-breaking behavior among
users by distorting individual users' perceptions of group
behavior. ° Strahilevitz further showed that file-sharing could not
honestly be shrouded in the noble mantel of civil disobedience
because typical file-swappers only share a small portion of their
music collections and thus cannot truly be motivated by a sense
of civil disobedience.7
In essence, a technological elite has empowered the
disregard of the rule of law by users. If this empowerment
resulted in a mass, majority rejection of the chosen rule, then the
distributing" A&M Records's copyrighted materials), affd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d
1004, 1027-29 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction against Napster, but placing "the burden on the plaintiffs to provide notice to
Napster of copyrighted works and files containing such works available on the Napster
system before Napster has the duty to disable access to the offending content").
65. See id. at 901-02, 911-12, 927 (noting that Napster's "peer-to-peer file sharing
system ... allows Napster users to conduct relatively sophisticated searches for music
files on the hard drives of millions of other anonymous users"); MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d
at 350, 352-53 (noting that MP3.com's service "permit[ed] subscribers to store,
customize[,] and listen to the recordings contained on their CDs from any place where
they have an Internet connection").
66. See Wu, supra note 51, at 731-37 (detailing the decentralized design of
Napster's sucessors).
67. Id. at 737.
68. See Thomas Mennecke, Gnutella on the Rise, SLYCK, July 21, 2004,
http://www.slyck.com/story530.html (chronicling the influx of former Napster users to
Gnutella networks when Napster failed).
69. Strahilevitz, supra note 57, at 535.
70. Id. at 550-52 ("The architecture of the networks is such that although many
users on the networks do not share, the networks create an appearance that sharing is
the norm.").
71. Id. at 573-74 (indicating alternative motivations behind file sharing).
1086 [44:4
HeinOnline  -- 44 Hous. L. Rev. 1086 2007-2008
THE RULE OF IP LAW
democratic legitimacy of the rule might be questioned. But,
according to a Pew Internet and American Life report in May
2007, the entire music downloading public in the United States
represents only 27% of internet users.72 Not all 27% of those
internet users are necessarily engaged in copyright infringing
activities.7 3 Thus, only a minority of Internet users appear to
reject the rule of intellectual property law, though they are a
visible minority.
The tremendous effort and creativity deployed to undermine
the rule of intellectual property law can also be seen in a larger
commercial context. Google is promoting two prominent
ventures, Google's YouTube and the Google Books Library
Project, each of which use new online technology to
fundamentally challenge the public law's copyright choices.4
These ventures present a technological attack on the copyright
principle of "fair use." The U.S. statutory framework allows
royalty-free copying of a protected work for certain types of
noncommercial uses, if the public benefits outweigh any losses to
authors.75  Google's technological designs, though, are
fundamentally about commercial gain. Siva Vaidhyanathan goes
even further and argues that "Google Library invites copyright
meltdown.
76
The Google Books Library Project seeks to scan and store
digitally as many books in print as possible so the books can be
searched online and so portions of their text can be displayed.7
Google has chosen to technologically reproduce the classic
libraries of the world for online digital dissemination. The idea
and scope of the project is undoubtedly extraordinary and
72. JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, A TYPOLOGY OF
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY USERS 2-3 (2007),
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PIPICT-Typology.pdf.
73. Id. (noting that 21% of internet users "[play to access or download digital
content online, such as music, video, or newspaper articles").
74. See Google Buys YouTube for $1.65 Billion, MSNBC.COM, Oct. 10, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15196982 (discussing the copyright concerns associated
with YouTube); Google Moving Ahead with Digital Library, MSNBC.COM, Sept. 18, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9392186 (predicting that the Google Books Library Project
will put current copyright laws to a "digital-age test").
75. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see Willaim F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and
Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1139, 1649 (2004) (explaining fair
use cases that "involvef] some harm to the copyright holder in lost revenues (and not
because of criticism) but the harm is more than offset by the sum of the benefits to others
and the savings in the transaction costs that would be incurred were licensing required").
76. Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything and the Future of
Copyright, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1221 (2007).
77. See Google, Google Books Library Project, http://www.google.comgooglebooks/
library.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
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provides important public benefits through the dissemination of
information. Yet Google wants to profit from the existence of
these copyrighted works without compensating the authors of the
copied works.7" In essence, Google makes a copy of each author's
work, for commercial gain, without any compensation to the
author.79 This is an exploitation of works of authorship. Google
argues that its use is transformative and thus a "fair use"
permitted under U.S. copyright law.8" Copyright owners,
however, are vigorously challenging Google's attack on the
owners' rights to control the copying and distribution of their
works."8 While the qualification of Google's actions as a fair use
under the legal criteria in the United States remains to be
determined by the courts, the project is global in scope, and the
broad American fair use exception is not a feature in other
national copyright laws. 82
The characterization of this project as a technological
rejection of law is well illustrated by another project that offers
an alternative approach in support of public law choices. The
Internet Archive and the Open Content Alliance, composed of
major companies such as Yahoo!, libraries, archives, and
universities such as Rice University and Columbia University,
78. Author's Complaint, supra note 8, 5; see Jonathan Band, The Google Library
Project: The Copyright Debate, LLRX.COM, June 10, 2006, http://www.llrx.com/
features/googlelibraryproject.htm (acknowledging that although Google will not profit
through direct advertising revenue, "Google hopes that by including a large number of
books in its search index, it will differentiate itself from its competitors and attract more
'eyeballs,' which in turn will lead to more advertising revenue").
79. Author's Complaint, supra note 8, 39.
80. Answer at 7, Author's Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (Nov. 30, 2005)
(asserting fair use as an affirmative defense); Posting of Susan Wojcicki to Official Google
Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/09/google-print-and-authors-guild.html (Sept.
20, 2005) ("Google repsects copyright. The use we make of all the books we scan through
the Library Project is fully consistent with both the fair use doctrine under U.S. copyright
law and the principles underlying copyright law itself, which allow everything from
parodies to excerpts in book reviews."); see also ROBIN JEWELER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
THE GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH PROJECT: IS ONLINE INDEXING A FAIR USE UNDER COPYRIGHT
LAW?. 2-5 (2005), http://opencrs.comlrpts/RS22356 20051228.pdf (analyzing Google's
claim that the Google Books Library Project qualifies as a permissible fair use).
81. See Author's Complaint, supra note 8, at 2-3; see also Elinor Mills, Author's
Guild Sues Google over Library Project, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 21, 2005,
http://news.com.com/2100-1030_3-5875384.html (discussing the Author's Guild's
copyright infringement suit against Google).
82. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 10,
Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (allowing
authorization for fair use); see also Tyler G. Newby, What's Fair Here Is Not Fair
Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1633, 1642-47 (1999) (examining the "comparative breadth of the
American fair use doctrine" by surveying copyright law in several other countries).
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are likewise scanning books and making them available online.83
But, these efforts only involve books that are already in the
public domain by operation of copyright law or the author's
choice.84 As such, this model uses technology to promote
legislative choices rather than to evade them.
In the realm of online video, Google has also challenged
public law choices with its acquisition of YouTube, the popular
video content hosting site. Google's purchase of the site for $1.65
billion effectively transformed the online community of users
sharing video into a commercial enterprise." The price reflected
value embodied in the third-party content stored on the site by
users.86 However, Google did not plan to compensate the owners
of the content." More troubling, a substantial quantity of the
content available on YouTube appears to have been posted
without authorization from the copyright owners.88 Similar to the
P2P technologies, the initial design and architecture of YouTube
empowered the rejection of the rights that the law accorded to
the video copyright owners.8 9 Interestingly, once Google was sued
83. See Open Library, The Vision, http://www.openlibrary.org/toc.html (last visited
Sept. 10, 2007) (listing the members of the Open Content Alliance and explaining how
The Open Library allows visitors to read books online for free); Open Content Alliance,
FAQ, http://www.opencontentalliance.org/faq.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2007) (detailing
the Open Content Alliance's goal of creating "a permanent archive of multilingual
digitized text and multimedia content).
84. See Open Content Alliance, FAQ, supra note 83 ("[Clontributors must secure the
permission of all concerned copyright holders prior to submitting materials to the OCA for
digitization or inclusion in the archive.").
85. See Press Release, Google, Google To Acquire YouTube for $1.65 Billion in
Stock, (Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/google-youtube.html
(announcing that the acquisition combines YouTube's enormous user network with
"Google's expertise in organizing information and creating new models for advertising on
the Internet").
86. See Tom Krazit, Google Makes Video Play With YouTube Buy, ZDNET, Oct. 9,
2006, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-6124094.html (citing statistics that YouTube
contained approximately 100 million videos at the time of its purchase, and quoting
Google cofounder Sergey Brin as recognizing the "advertising possibilities" therein).
87. See Katie Hafner, We're Google. So Sue Us., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, at C1
(quoting Google's general counsel, who reported that Google had "investigated that whole
issue" and planned to rely on the safe harbor provision of the DMCA to avoid liability).
The YouTube Terms of Service require users to grant YouTube a royalty-free
sublicenseable right to distribute and sell their uploaded content. See YouTube, YouTube
Terms of Service, art. 6, http://www.youtube.com/tIterms (last visited Aug. 26, 2007).
88. See, eg., Anne Broache & Greg Sandoval, Viacom Sues Google over YouTube Clips, CNET
NEWS.OOM, Mar. 13, 2007, httpJ/news.com.com/Viacom+sues+Google+over+YouTube+clips/
2100-1030_3-6166668.html (detailing Viacom's allegations that nearly 160,000 clips of
Viacom-copyrighted content had been posted to YouTube without Viacom's permission).
Viacom's original complaint is available at http://www.lessig.org/bloglarchivesvvg.pdf.
89. See YouTube Terms of Service, supra note 87, arts. 6-8, 11 (putting the
responsibility on users and copyright holders to police copyright infringement on YouTube
and denying responsibility for consequences of such infringement); see also John Palfrey
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by Viacom for copyright infringement on YouTube, Google agreed
to re-engineer YouTube's infrastructure to filter from the site
unauthorized, uploaded works that violate third-party
copyrights." In other words, when faced with a serious legal
challenge to the technological attack on public law choices,
Google appears to be relenting.
These technological attacks on copyrighted works are
reminiscent of the famous trademark case, Washington Post v.
TotalNews, Inc., in which TotalNews was sued for posting
content from third-party news sites within "frames" that
contained the TotalNews logo and URL.9' The plaintiffs
complained that TotalNews designed its technology to capture
value from others' work by selling advertising in the frames.92
The case settled with an order prohibiting TotalNews from
selling ads on content provided by Washington Post affiliates.93
Beyond the technology companies disrupting law, the most
novel and interesting technological attack on the rule of
intellectual property law comes from the "open source"
movement. In 1983, Richard Stallman launched the free software
movement and said, "I consider that the golden rule requires that
if I like a program I must share it with other people who like it. I
cannot in good conscience sign a nondisclosure agreement or a
software license agreement."94 In the ensuing years, Stallman
and the Free Software Foundation articulated an opposing model
& Stan Liebowitz, Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 11, 2006, http'//online.wsj.com/publiclarticle/SB116049721244288215.html
(differentiating YouTube from sites such as Napster and Grokster in that YouTube's
original purpose was to provide a forum for users' self-generated works but recognizing
that similar problems arise from the ease by which users can post copyright infringing
material).
90. See For YouTube, A System to Halt Copyright-Infringing Videos, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 2007, at C6 (detailing the proposed system's use of video recognition technology
that would recognize and automatically remove copyrighted work).
91. See Complaint I 7-10, Washington Post v. Total News, Inc., No. 97-1190
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1997), as reprinted at http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dlip'
washcomp.html (alleging that TotalNews produced little content of its own but generated
page views and advertising revenue by stealing and republishing the plaintiffs' news and
editorial stories).
92. See id. 51-55 (alleging that TotalNews' practice infringed plaintiffs'
trademarks by using the marks in connection with unauthorized advertising).
93. See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal $1 1, 3, Washington
Post v. Total News, Inc., No. 97-1190 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 6, 1997), as reprinted at
http://1egal.web.aol.com/decisions/dlip/washorde.html (dismissing the case and describing
the settlement reached by the parties).
94. Richard Stallman, About the GNU Project: Initial Announcement,
http://www.gnu.org/gnulinitial-announcement.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2007) (narrating
Stallman's reasons for beginning work on a "complete Unix-compatible software system"
that he intended to give away for free upon completion).
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to the legally created proprietary rights approach to information
innovation and creativity. This alternative model treats software
like an information commons:
Free software is a matter of the users' freedom to run, copy,
distribute, study, change and improve the software. More
precisely, it refers to four kinds of freedom, for the users of
the software:
* The freedom to run the program, for any purpose
(freedom 0).
* The freedom to study how the program works, and
adapt it to your needs (freedom 1). Access to the
source code is a precondition for this.
* The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help
your neighbor (freedom 2).
* The freedom to improve the program, and release
your improvements to the public, so that the whole
community benefits (freedom 3). Access to the
source code is a precondition for this.
A program is free software if users have all of these
freedoms. 5
In this sense, the "open source movement" was the first concerted
effort of technologists to rebel against the prevailing public law
choice.96 Indeed, Richard Stallman calls for the technical
community "to recognize the moral unacceptability of non-free
software."97 He even goes so far as to call the overthrow of
proprietary software "a moral imperative for Christian
communicators."'8
Ironically, the open source movement relies on copyright and
an onerous licensing scheme to implement its philosophy.99 The
General Public License, known as the GPL, is the basic
instrument used by software developers to promote this
95. Free Software Foundation, The Free Software Definition, http://www.gnu.org/
philosophy/free-sw.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2007).
96. Throughout this Article, the terms "free software movement" and the "open
source software movement" are used interchangeably.
97. Richard Stallman, The Free Software Community After 20 Years: With Great,
but Incomplete Success, What Now?, LINUX.COM, Jan. 5, 2004, http://www.linux.com
/articles/33525.
98. Richard Stallman, Stallman: Free Software Is a Moral Imperative for
Christians, http://www.wacc.org.uk/wacc/content/pdf/1691 (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
99. See Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital
Age, 49 STANFORD L. REV. 1487, 1504-11 (1997) (explaining the GPL and copyleft
licensing).
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information commons model. 1°' The license relinquishes the
privileges of copyright but requires developers to agree to allow
others to use their software freely.' Various other forms of open
source license agreements now also exist.
The commons model has its conceptual difficulties. Philip J.
Weiser notes that "the larger the Internet community becomes,
the more difficult it is to maintain a completely 'commons'
model."' '3 Polk Wagner goes further and challenges the open
source view that the control of information distribution through
intellectual property rights threatens the public domain of
information. 1 4 He shows that information production can still
thrive in a world of intellectual property controls and that the
dark side of open source is an encouragement of economic free-
riding.'
0 5
More significantly, in adopting the commons approach to
software, technologists reject the democratically expressed
preference for proprietary intellectual property. The open source
community creates instability that directly threatens legislative
choice. The intermingling of proprietary software with open
source software, or open source with proprietary, results in
uncertainty for intellectual property rights. Indeed, the
introduction of proprietary code in GNU/Linux, the basic open
source operating system-either maliciously or unintentionally-
is an Achilles Heel for the open source movement. The protracted
IBM/SCO litigation illustrates this problem.'6 As Jonathan
100. See Free Software Foundation, Inc., Licenses, http://www.gnu.org/licenses (last
visited Sept. 15, 2007) (explaining the GNU GPL and claiming that it is used by "more
than half of all free software packages").
101. See generally Free Software Foundation, Inc., GNU General Public License:
Version 3, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2007); Free Software
Foundation, Inc., The GNU General Public License: Version 2, http://www.opensource.org/
licenses/gpl-license.php (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
102. See Free Software Foundation, Inc., Licenses, http://www.fsf.org/licensing
licenses/indexhtml (last visited Sept. 10, 2007) (describing and providing links to several
different types of open source licenses); Opensource.org, Open Source Licenses,
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/category (last visited Aug. 27, 2007) (providing a list of
licenses approved as open source).
103. Philip J. Weiser, Internet Governance, Standard Setting, and Self-Regulation,
28 N. Ky. L. REV. 822, 830 (2001).
104. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1033 (2003).
105. See id. at 1029 ("[Olpen source software invites a form of free-riding whereby
open software is taken, improved or altered, and then distributed under the more typical
closed commercial model.").
106. See Pamela Jones, Summary of SCO v IBM, http://www.groklaw.netl
staticpages/index.php?page=20050315132709446 (last visited Sept. 7, 2005) (setting forth
the parties' current allegations and relief requested); see also Ronald Mann,
Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J. L.
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Zittrain points out, the legal system can cripple open source
through high stakes litigation over proprietary claims and cannot
easily resolve the conflict between the open and proprietary
models. ' °7
The legal instability created by open source licensing even
attacks works protected by the law's choice of intellectual property
rights. Greg Vetter, in an insightful piece, suggests the goal of
"infectious licenses" is to prevent the very existence of proprietary
software.' He argues that the public value of interoperability is
undermined by overbroad terms in infectious licenses like the
GPL.1°9 In other words, the open source community seeks to use a
market approach to impose political values on the network
participants. When mainstream companies like IBM and Sun
Microsystems adopt open source,"' they make normative decisions
about information flows through technological choices."' In effect,
the emphasis on market adoption empowers the private domination
of information flows without the political decisions embodying the
protection of citizens' rights that are expected in democratic society.
The open source community wants to make these political decisions
without the public order protections that democracies include in law
for minorities. In effect, open code shifts fundamentally political
decisions from democratic institutions to technological and network
elites. This shift undermines the philosophy of freedom and citizens'
rights in democracy.
& TECH. 1, 43 (2006) (noting that Linux may infringe 283 patents); Jonathan Zittrain,
Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
265, 266-67 (2004) (explaining the issue of using proprietary code in open source software
in SCO v. IBM, which may potentially result in "the conversion of the flagship example of
free, copylefted software into a proprietary system owned and controlled by SCO, one user
at a time").
107. See Zittrain, supra note 106, at 265, 285-87 ("[The costs of litigation are beyond
the reach of many free software developers.").
108. See Greg R. Vetter, "Infectious" Open Source Software: Spreading Incentives or
Promoting Resistance?, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 53, 58-59 (2004) ("Some estimate that infectious
terms promote open source growth by supporting community development norms and
preventing proprietary poaching of the software, or converting proprietary software to
open source.").
109. See id. at 59.
110. See Martin LaMonica, IBM Urges Sun to Make Java Open Source, CNET NEWS.COM,
Feb. 26, 2004, http://news.com.com/IBM+urges+Sun+to+make+Java+open+source
2100-1007_3-5165427.html (discussing IBM's open letter to Sun Microsystems,
requesting that Sun make Java open source).
111. See LESSIG, supra note 9, at 104-05 (tracking the shift from closed code to open
code and commenting on the motivations for this shift); Reidenberg, Lex Informatica,
supra note 9, at 554-55 ("[Tlhe set of rules for information flows imposed by technology
and communication networks form a 'Lex Informatica' that policymakers must
understand, consciously recognize, and engage."); see also Rob Merges, A New Dynamism
in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 184 (2004) (hypothesizing that open source
might be a market correction due to an overly protective intellectual property regime).
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V. NORMATIVE RESPONSES
The technologists' and network elites' challenges to
intellectual property rights go much deeper than intellectual
property law. Intellectual property law has democratic legitimacy
through its legislative enactment as a result of democratic
political processes. For example, whether one approves or not,
the DMCA legitimizes access control technologies because
legislators chose that rule. The technologists' evasions do not
have this democratic political legitimacy. The challenge thus goes
to society's very commitment to the rule of law. Law cannot
operate in the digital environment without technical code.
Indeed, technical infrastructure design plays a critical normative
role in democratic society and architecture defines rules for an
information network.'12 Yet, the relinquishment of the rule of law
for the control by code as sought by technologists in their fights
against intellectual property rights sets a dangerous precedent
for democracy.
The information society will necessarily have several critical
responses to address the technological challenge to democratic
authority. First, states cannot accept the contradiction of public
rulemaking. To do otherwise would constitute an abdication of
the public responsibilities entrusted to the state by its citizens at
the ballot boxes. Second, states will increase intermediary
liability. The DMCA, for example, allows greater liability for
intermediaries through the notice and take-down safe-harbor
rules than the earlier telecommunications rules that totally
precluded internet service providers' responsibility for the
content they carried."3 Similarly, the Supreme Court's Grokster
decision illustrates a greater willingness to impose intermediary
liability.14  These decisions increasing liability will affect
112. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45
EMORY L.J. 911, 917 (1996) ("System design imposes rules of order on an information
society."); Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, supra note 9, at 568-69. (distinguishing Lex
Informatica from the substantive legal rules as the impositions placed on information
flows by technological choices).
113. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000) (granting limited immunity for hosts of
infringing content only where the host receives notification of claimed infringement and
properly removes or disables the content), with 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000) (declaring that
ISPs are not treated as publishers, thus absolving them of responsibility for content
provided by another). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors
1-2 (Stanford Public Law Working Paper, No. 979836, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=979836 (discussing intermediary liability and safe harbor rules).
114. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919
(2005) ("We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.").
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architectural designs in ways that will support the public law
decisions. To the extent that technologists will then seek to evade
new legal rules, further state intervention is likely. And lastly,
states will increasingly focus laws on the technologies
themselves. By way of illustration, the DMCA prohibits
anticircumvention devices,"' and the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires digital
communications service providers to make their networks
"wiretap-ready" through specific technical capabilities.1 ' These
technology-focused laws will seek to assure functionality that
supports the public law decisions. In combination, these three
types of state responses channel the network elite's opposition to
legislative policy choices in ways that will assure the rule of law
rather than the rule of technology.
In short, democracy must prevail over the "technocracy."
115. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2000) (advancing a strict prohibition against devices
used "to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title").
116. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000) (requiring telecommunication carriers to have
.equipment, facilities, or services" capable of allowing properly authorized government
interceptions of "wire and electronic communications").
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